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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----- - - - - - - - - - - - - f"l.ANNINC;,

'1'111
111

-·1rµnrat inn,

INC.,

Plaint1fE-Appellant,

No.

vs.

18968

llANK OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant, Research
Planning,

Inc., against defendant-respondent, Bank of Utah,

wherein plaintiff claimed that defendant paid checks drawn
against one of its depositor's general checking accounts with
knowledge that the depositor was misappropriating funds held by
the depositor as a

fiduciary,

or that checks were paid by defen-

rlant from said depositor's account with sufficient information
that its actions in paying said checks constituted bad faith
under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9,

The Bank of Utah defended the

artion on the basis that the evidence did not support the claim
that
1t

it either had actual knowledge of misappropriation or that

acted in bad faith.
l'in on the basis that

1

r1

d1 1'ncl1e Annntat• d

l1P

0

,i.n

The Bank of Utah further defended the
the plaintiff's claims were barred by
ancl/or

because plaintiff

adverse Claim tn a deposit:. ()(" instrument in pOSSeSSiOn Of

-1-

the Bank but failed to meet the requirements set

forth by the

statutes to restrict the Bank's payment of checks 11rawn againsi
such deposit or instrument.
'

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The case was tried to the District Court without a

jury.

Judgement was entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff
on all claims made by plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the

judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about August 8,

1980, Roger LeFevre, the Chief

Executive Officer of First Capital Mortgage Loan Corporation,
opened a general checking account at the Eagle Gate Branch of the
Bank of Utah located in Salt Lake City.

[Tr.

406-407; Exhibits

4-5]
On August 18, 1980, Research Planning,

Inc (hereinafter

"Research Planning" or "appellant"), a company which provided
investment services for its clients,

[Tr.

353)

entered into a

Real Estate Loan Agreement and also an Escrow Agreement with R.
K.

Buie & Associates

(hereinafter "Buie").

[Exhibits 2,

Under the terms of the Real Estate Loan Agreement,

21]

Research

Planning agreed to loan Buie $260,000 to purchase and develop
property in Ogden,

Utah.

[Tr.

353;

Exhibit 2)

As part of the

Real Estate Loan Agreement and the Escrow Agreement,

-2-

Research

and Buie agreed to employ First Capital Mortgage Loan

l'],rnn 1 rHJ

'',it

icrn

(hereinafter "First Capital") as escrow agent to hold

''h0,000 until
1Xl1iliits

2,

final closing of the transaction.

[Tr. 354;

21]

First Capital had a prior lien on the Ogden property,
which Research Planning wanted First Capital to subordinate, so
that Research Planning would have a first trust deed securing its
loan of $260,000 on the property.

First Capital agreed to subor-

dinate its lien to Research Planning and signed a subordination
agreement.

[Tr.

354,

358; Exhibits 2, 21, 22, 23, 24]

On August 18, 1980, Buie executed a Trust Deed covering
the subject property in favor of Research Planning, with First
Capital acting as trustee.

[Exhibit 26]

On the same date, Buie

executed a note in the amount of $260,000 in favor of Research
Planning.

The note was also signed by Steven F. Alder, and the

note was further personally guaranteed by R. Kent Buie, Chief
Executive Officer of Buie, and by Steven F. Alder.
2 'i I

[Exhibit

.
The Real Estate Loan Agreement

Agreement

[Exhibit 2], the Escrow

[Exhibit 21], the Subordination Agreement

[Exhibit 24],

the Trust Deed Note [Exhibit 25], and the Trust Deed [Exhibit 26]
•ere apparently all executed on August 18, 1980, during a meeting
held

in Roger LeFevre's office.

Present at the meeting in

[,.,pµvre's office were Michael Purles, an officer of Research
ri 'nning

[Tr.

352], Roger Lefevre, Merrill Weech (Research

-3-

Planning's attorney), R.

Kent Buie, Chief Executive Officer of

Buie, and possibly also Steven Alder (attorney for Au1e).

[Tr.

356-357]
The signing of all the above-referenced documents and
the consummation of the above-referenced agreements among
Research Planning, Buie and First Capital was the result of negotiations among Mr.

Purles, Mr Buie and Mr.

Lefevre carried on for

in excess of 30 days prior to August 18, 1980.

[Tr.

355]

The Bank of Utah (hereinafter "Bank" or "respondent")
was not a party to,

nor represented at, nor did it have any

knowledge of, any of the negotiations among Research Planning,
Buie and First Capital or any of the agreements resulting from
said negotiations.

[Tr.

356-357, 366, 388-389, 439]

Michael Purles brought a check in the amount of $260,000
drawn on Research Planning's trust account to the August 18,

1980, meeting at LeFevre's office, which was the loan amount
agreed to.
[Tr.

357]

The check was probably made payable to First Capital.
Lefevre stated that he wanted a cashier's check

instead of the trust account check.

Pursuant to LeFevre's

request, Purles agreed to cancel the trust account check and to
obtain a cashier's check.

[Tr.

359]

When the meeting at

LeFevre's office ended on August 18, 1980, Purles

immediately

went to Walker Bank & Trust in Salt Lake City and obtained a
cashier's check payable to Buie and First Capital in the amount
of $260,000.

R.

Kent Buie and Roger Lefevre met Purles at Walket

Bank, and Purles delivered the cashier's check to them at the

-4-

[Tr.

359-360]

Purles knew that Buie would endorse the

check to First Capital because First Capital was going
!"'

, I,,,,

the escrow agent holding the funds.

[Tr.

360-361]

Purles

knew that First Capital would take the check and deposit it

into its account.

Purles knew that First Capital would draw

dgainst its account and believed First Capital would use the
$260,000 in accordance with the terms of the loan agreement and
the escrow agreement.

[Tr.

361]

The $260,000 cashier's check, which was subsequently
endorsed by Buie to First Capital, was presented by LeFevre for
deposit to First Capital's general checking account with the Bank
of Utah on August 19, 1980.

[Tr. 426]

The deposit was made to

the same checking account opened by First Capital on or about
August 8, 1980.

First Capital's account was a general checking

account, or a demand account.

[Tr. 429]

Roger LeFevre was the

only required signator to draw checks on First Capital's account.
[Tr.

429]

A Bank is obligated to pay checks drawn on a demand

account when presented if the checks contain a proper signature
and there is sufficient money in the account to cover the check.
Failure of the Bank to make such payment could result in liability to its depositors.

[Tr. 429]

Appellant, Buie and Alder were not parties to the First
Capital general checking account.
h1

sign checks on sairl account,

"'""' the account.

[Tr.

368,

None of them were authorized

nor did they have any control

397,

-5-

398, 430]

After the $260,000

cashier's check was presented for deposit at the Bank of Utah,
the Bank verified the validity of said check hy cnntact1ng Walk•·r
Bank, the bank which issued the cashier's check,
verifying the endorsement of R.

3nd ily a[,,

Kent Buie on said clteck.

1

[Tr.

437-438]

Once the validity of the cashier's check had been

verified,

it could not be returned,

and the Bank had a duty to

pay checks drawn against that deposit

in First Capital's account.

[Tr. 438]
On August 19, 1980, after the cashier's check had been
presented to the Bank for deposit, Steve Alder, Buie's attorney,
went to the Bank and spoke with Roger Barth, Assistant Manager of
the Eagle Gate Branch of the Bank of Utah.

Alder asked if a

deposit of $260,000 had been made to First Capital's account and
learned that it had.
Mr.

Mr. Alder was a stranger to the account.

Barth had never met Alder before.

The only information

Barth had regarding Alder was what Alder told him,

to-wit, that

Alder was a lawyer and that he said he represented Buie.

[Tr.

4 30 l

Alder asked Barth to tell him the balance in First
Capital's account.

Barth refused to give this information.

Alder told Barth that the $260,000 deposit was for a specific
purpose.

Barth told Alder that First Capital's account was a

general checking account and that checks would be paid from the
account on a first-come,

first-served basis.

Alder asked Barth

to call him if there were any problems on the account, which
Barth said he would do.

Al<ler never tol<l Barth the specific pur-

-6-

,..
" t 11
1

1c>n.

11y

ten which the $260,000 was to be used.

He did not tell

that the funcls were to be used for a real estate transacHe never told Barth that the funds were to be transmitted

r'lrst Capital to a title company, and he never mentioned

anything about Research Planning's interest in the money.
430-431]

In fact,

[Tr.

the first time Barth learned that Research

Planning had an interest in the money was when his deposition was
taken later in September of 1980, in a separate lawsuit filed
against LeFevre and some of the corporations he was involved
with.

[Tr. 431]
The Bank proceeded to make payment of several checks

8rawn on First Capital's account during the course of the day on
August 19, 1980.

Three of the checks drawn against the account

were paid on August 19th by cashier's checks issued by the Bank
of Utah.

One was payable to First Security Bank in the amount of

$66,000, another to National Title Guaranty in the amount of
$25,500, and a third to Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of
$80,000.

Another check was paid by wire transfer to a company

called Nature's Estates & Associates,
$27,500.

Inc.

in the amount of

Some of these checks had been written prior to August

19th and presented to the Bank of Utah for collection.

At the

of another bank or of a person to whom a check has been
written, a bank will hold a check for collection if there are
ir1suff1cient funds to pay the check at the time it is first pre;.•ritPd for payment.

It is not uncommon for people to write

-7-

checks before they actually have money to cover them,

[Tr.

433-434]
Late in the aftern<oon of August

19,

1 <J80,

a cfH>c-k

amount of $250,000 was presented to the Bank f•n payment
First Capital's account.
account,

1n

t

1

from

The Bank became concerned about the

because there were insufficient funds to cover that

large of a check.

The Bank was concerned because payment of the

check would mean creating a possible overdraft.

Therefore, a

hold was placed on First Capital's checking account, meaning that
checks presented to the Bank through normal banking channels
would not be paid, but that checks drawn on the account would be
paid upon specific approval by the Bank where the account contained sufficient funds to cover the checks.
446, 447'

449]

The Bank was not concerned that Mr.

misappropriating funds,
[Tr. 444, 446,

[Tr.

434,

437, 444,

Lefevre was

but that an overdraft might be created.

449]

A hold to the extent of $95,500 had been placed on First
Capital's account prior to August 19, 1980, because the Bank had
learned that a check in the amount of $95,500 payable and deposited to First Capital's account was going to be returned, and
would not he available for payment of checks drawn on First
Capital's account.

However, when the $260,000 cashier's check

was deposited on August 19, 1980,

it provided First Capital's

account with sufficient funds to make payment on the checks whic'
were paid on August 19th and subsequent thereto.
The draws made by First Capital on its account

-8-

.11

the $260,000, and it was subsequently learned that First

"I
''

'I

""''rl

1 f1t-->y

t rinse funds for purposes other than the use for

werf?

intended.

The Bank had no knowledge of the specific use for which
1 '"'

$260,000 was

intended, and the Bank also had no knowledge of

tl1<-'

purpose for which First Capital actually used the $260,000
from its checking account.

[Tr.

431, 439, 441]

On August 19, 1980, when the $260,000 was deposited to
First Capital's account, no one representing appellant notified
the Bank that appellant had an interest in the funds,

nor did

anyone from appellant notify the Bank regarding the purpose to
which the funds were to be put.
made by Mr. Alder to Mr.

[Tr.

rapital's account.

The statements

Barth on August 19, 1980 were made for

and on behalf of Buie only.
Planning had any interest

[Tr. 405, 431]

Alder never told Barth that Research

in the $260,000 deposited to First
385]

Research Planning never made any

claim against the Bank until it filed suit against the Bank on
.Jul/ 7,

1981.

[Tr.

363-366, 394-396, 447, 455]

Appellant never presented a sworn affidavit, an indemnity bond, or a court-ordered injunction to the Bank to prevent
thP Rank
[Tr.

from paying checks drawn on First Capital's account.

366,

367]
The Bank of Utah did not know that the $260,000 was to

1

in a r'?a

1 ... ,

,111 ..

t

1

est a tf? transact i0n.

It had no knowledge of

11,_, sr>l l"'r nf the pr"perty was, who the escrow agent was, who

-9-

the title company was, or who may have held liens on the property
that needed to be satisfied at closing.

All

information wa·

available to plaintiff, Rule, and/or Alder, but none of
information or any documents evidencing such information were
ever made available by plaintiff, Buie or Alder to the Bank of
Utah.

[Tr. 356-357, 366, 388, 389, 439]
As will be set forth more fully below,

it is

respondent's position that the Bank had no knowledge that First
Capital was misappropriating funds it held as a fiduciary.
Moreover, the Bank did not act in bad faith when it paid checks
drawn on First Capital's account because the account was a
general, demand checking account, and the Bank had an obligation
to its depositor to pay checks drawn on the account so long as
there were sufficient funds to cover the check.

Bad faith means

dishonesty, and there is no evidence that the Bank acted dishonestly.

In addition,

it is respondent's position that

plaintiff's claims are barred by Utah Code Annotated §§7-3-50 and
70A-3-603 because appellant failed to meet the requirements of
those statutes where adverse claims were made to a deposit or
instrument held by the Bank.

-10-

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER LEGAL
STANDARD UNDER u.c.A. §22-1-9 IN RULING
THAT THE HANK DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH
UNLESS IT ACTED DISHONESTLY.
Plaintiff's claim against the Bank of Utah is based on
rrtrth Code Annotated §22-1-9, which states:
If a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank
to his personal credit to checks drawn by
him upon an account in his own name as
fiduciary, or of checks payable to him as
fiduciary, or of checks drawn by him upon
an account in the name of his principal,
if he is empowered to draw checks thereon,
or if checks payable to his principal or
endorsed by him, if he is empowered to
endorse such checks, or if he otherwise
makes a deposit of funds held by him as
fiduciary, the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether the
fiduciary is committing thereby a breach
of his obligation as fiduciary; and the
bank is authorized to pay the amount of
the deposit or any part thereof upon the
personal check of the fiduciary without
being liable to the principal, unless the
bank receives the deposit or pays the
check with actual knowledge that the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his
obligation as fiduciary in making such
deposit or in drawing such checks, or
with knowledge of such facts that its
action in receiving a deposit or paying a
check amounts to bad faith.
Under this statute, a bank can be held liable only in
two situations.

First,

if the bank had actual knowledge that its

depositor was misappropriating trust funds when checks were paid
<in

tt.'3

account,

m•t1nn sn that

and, second,
its conduct

if the bank had sufficient infor-

in paying a check constituted bad

-11-

faith.
Appellant's statement of the relief sought on arr•e ol anc1
its points raised in argument clearly indicate thar

it d(t·c

dispute the trial court's finding that the Bank of Utah

r,,,1

no•

lid

have actual knowledge of misappropriation when it paid
drawn on First Capital's general checking account.

Thus,

appellant admits it failed to meet the "actual knowledge" burdbn
of proof.

Appellant asks this court to hold that "bad fai:n"

under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9 does not mean dishonest I·
order for this court to make such a ruling,

Li

it would be

to overrule prior Utah law and also apply a definition

is

contrary to that applied by numerous other jurisdictions.
"Bad faith" as used in §22-1-9, was defined by the Utah
Supreme Court in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v.

Zions First Nac.o•al

Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968).

In this case,

plaintiff had a checking account with Walker Bank.
plaintiff's manager, a Mr.

the

The

Davis, was authorized to draw

on the Walker Bank checking account with one other requirPd
signature on the checks.

Davis drew 32 checks on plaintil''s

account making them payable to various payees.

The check3

,,,.r..

endorsed by one other individual, not by any of the named
and were then deposited by Davis into his account at Zions

ircc

National Bank.

'"''"

The checks drawn on the Walker Bank accounc

honored and charged against plaintiff's account.
the money from his account at Zions First National Bank
verted it to his own use.

-12-

"'"<.

c , ..

Plaintiff filed suit against both Walker Bank and Zions
1t

".,.,t

i·rnal Flnnk.

'.u:ins '"ith prejudice and plaintiff appealed.

l•·l•·11'1<"d <in
'''

t l1P

The trial court dismissed the claims
Zions

the basis of Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9.

Referring

bad faith standard, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The statute does not define "bad faith."
However, it defines "good faith" as being
done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.
"Bad faith" is the
antithesis of good faith and has been
defined in the cases to be when a thing
is done dishonestly and not merely negligently.
It is also defined as that
which imports a dishonest purpose and
implies wrong-doing or some motive of
self-interest.
(440 P.2d at 870]

Thus,

in order to prove bad faith under U.C.A. §22-1-9, the

plaintiff must prove that the Bank acted dishonestly.
The Sugarhouse Finance court also made some very pertinent comments regarding the purposes of §22-1-9, as follows:
The purposes to be accomplished by this
Act would seem to be to facilitate
banking and financial transactions by
relieving the depositary banks and others
dealing with a fiduciary from the duty
imposed at common law of seeing that
fiduciary funds are properly applied to
the account of the principal.
In other
words, the statute places a duty upon
principals to use only honest f iduciaries, and gives relief to those who
deal with fiduciaries except where they
know the fiduciary is breaching his duty
to his principal or where they have
knowledge of such facts that their action
in dealing with the fiduciary amounts to
bad faith.
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. There may be a lot of reasons why
a principal and his fiduciary may engage
in odd and unusual check writing, such,
for example, as making a political
contribution or putting funds into a
secret agent's possession to purchase
property and holcl it in a name other
than that of the principal.
The statute
was intended to cover just such
situations.
If a principal cannot trust
his agent with money, he ought to put the
agent under bond.
[_!.£. l
Thus, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was intended to limit
and narrow the liability of banks.

The statute is designed to

place the responsibility for the honesty of fiduciaries on the
principal.
The Utah Supreme Court made reference to U.C.A. §22-1-9
in Movie Films,

Inc. v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 22

Utah 2d 1, 447 P.2d 38 (1968), and stated that "the purpose of
[§22-1-9]

is to protect the bank where it allows withdrawals on

the personal order of a fiduciary who may be breaching his trust,
unless the latter fact

is known to the bank."

[447 P.2d at 40,

Footnote 2]
Th is court approved the Suharhouse Finance definition of
bad faith in Braswell Motor Frgt. Lines,
Lake,

Inc. v. Bank of Salt

28 Utah 2d 347, 502 P.2d 560 (1972), wherein it stated:
There is no suggestion that the bank
knew of any fraudulent scheme or acted in
bad faith in its dealings with the depositor Kendall.
As to the meaning of the
term "bad faith" see Sugarhouse Finance
Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 21 Utah
2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968).
[502 P.2cl at
562 J
Appellant suggests that the Utah Supreme Court's prinr
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!1nl.I i nqs

, "'

part of the bank does not comport with the meaning

,,,Jp<'J
1

''l''t

i1J1

that proof of bad faith requires a showing of dishonesty

tor the term "bad faith" by the drafters of the Uniform

i 'r i es Act.

Respondent suggests that appellant's argument,

this court's reasoning,

is erroneous.

This court does not

nPerl to look to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act to
interpret the term bad faith.
On numerous occasions, this court has set down the basic
principles relating to statutory construction.

In Cannon v.

McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1980), the court stated:
In interpreting the statutory language
care must be taken to construe the words
used in light of the total context of the
legislation, and when the construction of
a section involves technical words and
phrases which are defined by statute, the
provision must be construed according to
such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition.
[615 P.2d at 1270]
The court need not consider the underlying intent of the legislature when interpreting a statute unless there is ambiguity in the
language itself.

In State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah

1974), this court stated that "there is nothing to construe where
there is no ambiguity in the statute."

This same principle was

applied in Matheson v. Crockett, 577 P.2d 948 (Utah 1978),
wherein the court stated:
we may look to the intention of the
legislature when there exists an ambiguity in the language of the statute.
Here we find no ambiguity at all .
[577 P.2d at 949)
In the recent case of Utah State Democratic Committee v.
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Monson, 652 P.2d 890 (1982), this court made the following
statement:
Lastly, Huish points out that §20-1-lS
and §20-3-3 are legislative expressions
that election laws shall be liberally
construed to insure persons "full
opportunity" to become candidates and for
voters to express their choice.
Those
expressions, however, avail us nothing
because there is nothing to construe
where there is no ambiguity in the
statute.
State v. Archuletta, Utah, 526
P.2d 911 (1974); H--L-- v. Matheson, Utah,
604 P.2d 907 (1979).
[652 P.2d at 893]
In H--L-- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979), the argument was
raised that the term "if possible" in a statute was ambiguous.
This court stated:
There is no ambiguity in the term "if
possible" within the context of subsection (2); and, therefore, there is no
basis to construe the term beyond its
literal, plain meaning.
[604 P.2d at
913]
This court has made it clear, as shown above, that
reference to the underlying intent of the legislature or drafters
of a statute is unnecessary when construing the terms in the statute unless those terms are ambiguous.

Sugarhouse Finance looked

to the express language of the statute to determine the meaning
of bad faith.
follows:

Utah Code Annotated §22-1-1 defines good faith as

"A thing is done 'in good faith'

when it is in fact

done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not."

The court

in Sugarhouse Finance made a logical and reasonable decision when
it stated that "'Bad faith'

is the antithesis of good faith and

has been defined in the cases to be when a thing is done dis-
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,I I

y anrl not merely negligently."

,
J• ,,, , ,

ot
And

440 P. 2d at 870.

the statute is clear on its face.

The

It is not ambig-

there is no need to go beyond the plain language of the

in defining bad faith.
However, even if the legislative intent is considered,
rhe court must "construe [statutes]
,,f the legislation •

in light of the total context

Cannon v. McDonald, supra.

This was

done by the Utah court in Sugarhouse Finance where it defined the
purposes of the Fiduciaries Act, which are to facilitate banking
by narrowing

the bank's liability, and to put the responsibility

for honest fiduciaries on the principal.

The definition of bad

faith applied in Sugarhouse Finance and approved in Braswell
Motor Fgt. Lines, Inc., clearly comports with the purposes of the
statute.
Respondent notes with interest that nearly every case
and legal treatise cited by appellant to support its argument
that bad faith does not mean dishonesty predate Sugarhouse
Finance and Braswell Motor Fgt. Lines, Inc.
Goodman v. Simons, 20 How.

Specifically,

343 (1857), does not even involve a

rlaim made against a bank where one of its depositors was a fiduciary.

The instant case must be determined within the confines

•nd context of the fiduciaries statute, upon which plaintiff
Goodman v. Simons is irrelevant to the instant case
use
, I .lt Ute'•

it does not

involve a similar fact situation or the same

case cited by appellant to support its argument,
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except two, were available to the Utah Surn"'"'' Court

at

t hP

it made its rlecisi0n i:i Sugarhouse Finance and flrdSW<>l l,
court chose to follow the clear language of the

t

irnc

nw
as well

as the intent of the legislature in holrling that bad fdith means
rlishonesty,

and those rlecisions should not be overruled.

Appellant argues that if a bank remains passive in the
face of facts clearly suggesting fiduciary misconduct,
faith exists.

However, one of the cases cited by appellant

belies this very argument.
Davis v. Penn. Co.
Pa.

then bad

Appellant quotes from the case of

for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, 337

456, 12 A.2d 66 (1940), at page 16 of its brief as follows:
At what point does negligence cease and
bad faith begin? The distinction between
them is that bad faith, or dishonesty is,
unlike negligence, wilful.
The mere
failure to make inquiry, even though
there be suspicious circumstances, does
not constitute bad faith •
. unless
such failure is due to the deliberate
desire to evade knowledge because of a
belief or fear that inquiry would
disclose a vice or defect in the transaction, -- that is to say, where there is
an intentional closing of the eyes or the
stopping of the ears.
[emphasis added]

Davis clearly indicates that passive behavior on the part of a
bank cannot constitute bad faith.

Davis states that bad faith

means dishonesty and requires wilful,

intentional conduct on the

part of a bank.
The Utah Supreme Court

is not alone in holrling that

proof of bad faith requires proof of rl1shonesty.
County Commissioners v.

First National Bank,
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In Board of

168 P.2d 132 (Wyo.

11,

'I ,

the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the same definition of

• 11
,,,, 1

'"l

Ii

dS

The

court quoted approvingly the following statement from
v.

'J9S

lJtah' s court adopted in Sugarhouse Finance.

Beacon Participations, Inc.,

297 Mass.

398, 8 N.E.2d

(1937):
"'Bad faith' is a general and somewhat
indefinite term.
It has no constricted
meaning.
It cannot be defined with
exactness.
It is not simply bad
judgment.
It is not merely negligence.
It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity.
It implies conscious
doing of wrong.
It means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will.
It partakes of the
nature of fraud."
[368 P.2d at 139]

National Cas. Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill.App. 66, 45 N.E.

2d

698 (1942), stated that "Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose
and implies wrongdoing through some motive of self-interest."
The New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the bad faith
slandard under the Fiduciaries Act in Transport Trucking Co. v.
First National Bank, 61 N.M.

320, 300 P.2d 476 (1956), and

stated:
The sections of the Fiduciaries Act
mentioned and other sections of the Act
indicate exculpation or the relieving of
a bank when it is sought to be charged by
a fiduciary's principal.
The Act provides that the bank may be chargeable when
its action in receiving the deposit or
paying the check amounts to bad faith,
such action of the bank must be wilful
and even though there be suspicious circumstances, the failure to make inquiry
does not constitute bad faith on the part
of the bank.
The purpose of the Uniform
Fiduciary Act was to facilitate banking
transactions by relieving a depository,
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acting honestly, of the duty of
as to the right of its depositors, even
though fiduciaries, to check out their
accounts.
[emphasis ddded] [300 P.2d at
479]
The New Mexico Supreme Court also quoted approvingly
from Davis v. Penn. Co.,

337 Pa.

case of Roswell State Bank v.

456,

12 A. 2d 66 ( 1940), in the

Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., 56 N.M.

107, 240 P.2d 1143 (1952), wherein it was stated:
"The words 'bad faith' are not defined in
the act, but Section l(a), 20 P.S.
§33ll(l)(a), states that 'A thing is
done "in good faith" within the meaning
of this act, when it is in fact done
honestly, whether it be done negligently
or not.'
Since 'bad' is the antonym of
'good,' it follows that a thing is done
in bad faith, within the meaning of the
act, only when it is done dishonestly and
not merely negligently."
[240 P.2d at
1148]
One of the earliest cases analyzing the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act was Colby v. Riggs National Bank, 92 F.2d 183
(D.C.Cir. 1937).

The court defined bad faith as follows:

[W)e think the .
• expression, acts
done with knowledge of such facts as
amount to bad faith, means, as indicated
by subsection (2) of §1, acts done dishonestly.
[92 F. 2d at 194]
Subsection (2) of §1, referred to by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in the Colby case is the definition of good faith.
It states:
A thing is done "in good faith" within
the meaning of this Act [Chapter), when
it is in fact done honestly, whether it
be done negligently or not.
[92 F.2d at
188, Footnote 4]
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The
111

ih

basic definition of good faith is contained in

F irluciaries

Act.

v. First National Bank of Nevada, 553 P.2d 955
1976), cited by appellant in support of its position,

in

requires much more than the passive standard proposed by
3ppellant.

The Nevada Supreme Court stated:
The underlying purpose of the [Uniform
Fiduciaries] Act was to facilitate the
performance by fiduciaries of their obligations, rather than to favor any particular class of persons dealing with
fiduciaries.
The Act was clearly
meant to relax the standards of care owed
by banks to principals and third parties
when dealing with fiduciary accounts •
• Liability cannot be predicated on a
showing of lack of due care, or negligence, because "bad faith" imports a
moral connotation approximating purposeful or motivated conduct
(misconduct).
[553 P.2d at 958]

On the basis of the foregoing,

respondent respectfully

suggests to the court that the definition of bad faith applied in
the trial court as set forth in Sugarhouse Finance,

is the proper

legal standard to be applied under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9.
Since appellant readily admits that it cannot meet the burden of
proof to show dishonest conduct on the part of respondent, this
court should affirm the decision of the lower court.
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POINT I I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OP FACT rHA'r
rHE 1-lANK Dl D NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWU:IJGI:: OP
MISAPPROPRIATION AND DID NOT ACT IN BAD
PAITH ARC SIJPPORTfoD 1-lY THI:: r:VlDr:NCE AND
SHOULD NOT Bl:: DISTURBED ON APPEAL.
Appellant does not dispute in its brief the trial
court's findinq that the Bank paid out checks on

First Capital';

account without actual knowledge of misappropriation.
knowledge," as used in U.C.A.
Riggs National Bank, supra,

"Actual

§22-1-9 was defined in Colby v.

as follows:

In Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Jirard Trust
Co., 307 Pa. 488, 161 A. 865, 867, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed
the expression, "actual knowledge of
breach of his obligation as fiduciary"
-- to be the equivalent of -misappropriation.
Thus wherever the
words appear in the Act they are to be
read to mean, actual knowledge of
misappropriation.
[I]t is obvious that in the use
of the words "actual knowledge" Congress
meant to change the rule previously
applied in many courts, of constructive
or implied or imputed knowledge, and we
think there can be no doubt that there is
a marked distinction between actual
knowledge and constructive or implied
knowledge.
The former consists in
expressed information of a fact.
[92
F.2d at 194)
In Trenton Trust Co. v. Western Sur. Co.,
(.'10.

599 S.W.2d 481

1980), the court stated that "'actual knowledge' of a breach

of fiduciary obligation in this context has been defined to mean
the
[599

'present awareness'

s.w.

that such a breach is taking place."

at 491)
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Thus,
"l•

0

•h;e of misappropriation, the evidence would need to show
i><'

•I,

in order to prove that respondent had actual

11ank was presently aware that First Capital was

111pr•ipriating monies it held as a fiduciary for appellant at
time the Bank paid checks drawn on First Capital's account.

1

The evidence clearly does not show this.

As set forth in

respondent's Statement of Facts, when the Bank paid checks drawn
on First Capital's account after the deposit of the $260,000
check,

the only thing the Bank knew was that a $260,000 cashier's

check had been deposited to First Capital's general, demand
checking account;

that a person (Mr. Alder) claiming to be the

attorney for Buie asserted that the $260,000 was to be used for a
opecif ic purpose; and that the Bank owed an obligation to its
depositor to pay checks drawn on the account when there was sufficient

funds available to make payment.

The Bank had no

knowledge of the terms of the real estate loan from Research
Planning to Buie.

The Bank had no knowledge of the terms of the

Escrow Agreement among Research Planning, Buie and First Capital.
The Bank did not know that the $260,000 was to be used to
purchase real estate.

The Bank did not know any of the details

the real estate transaction.

Even if the Bank had known that

the money was to be used for a real estate transaction, when it
paid checks drawn on First Capital's account, it could not have
known that

those checks were being used for an improper purpose.

;Pveral of the checks were payable to other banks.
•µnt

t0 a title company.

One check

Such payments are clearly within the
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scope of a normal real estate transaction.

Plaintiff's attornc'/

Merrill Weech, testified that it is not uncommon for several
checks to be drawn payable to various parties at the closing of
real estate transaction.

[Tr.

453]

Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court's finding that the Bank paid the checks drawn on the
First Capital account without actual knowledge of
misappropriation.

The trial court's finding that the Bank did

not act in bad faith when it paid checks drawn on First Capital's
account is also supported by the evidence.
I, supra,

As set forth in Point

in order to prove bad faith under Utah Code Annotated

§22-1-9, the evidence must show that the Bank acted dishonestly.
Not only does the evidence show that the Bank did not act dishonestly,

but appellant admitted in closing argument that the

Bank did not act dishonestly.

[Tr. 461-464]

This court will not

reverse the trial court's findings of fact so long as they are
supported by substantial or sufficient evidence and unless they
are clearly erroneous or are clearly against the weight of the
evidence.

See Erickson v. Beardall,

(1968); Nunley vs. Walker,
Knight v.

Leigh,

13 Utah 2d 105,

369 P.2d 117 (1962);

619 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); Garcia v.

Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651
P.2d

20 Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210

(Utah 1982); Kinkella v. Baugh,

(Utah 1983), No.

17967,

filed March 7,

1983.

Since

the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence and are not clearly erroneous nor clearly against the
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ot

'I,

the evidence, the findings should not be disturbed on

an<l the judgment should be affirmed.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
THE BANK OF UTAH IS NOT LIABLE TO RESEARCH
PLANNING EVEN UNDER THE BAD FAITH STANDARD
ESPOUSED BY RESEARCH PLANNING.
Even if this court were to interpret bad faith to

require proof of something less than dishonesty, the evidence is
still inadequate, as a matter of law, to prove bad faith on the
part of respondent.

Appellant relies heavily on the case of

Trenton Trust Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 599 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1980),
in support of its argument that bad faith means something less
than dishonesty.

In Trenton Trust Co., a Mrs. Hook was appointed

guardian of the estates of her two minor children, which estates
were funded with monies obtained from the proceeds of a life
insurance policy on the father of the children, which benefits
were paid to the children when the father died.

Since the

children were still under the age of majority at that time, their
was appointed guardian.

Two checks of approximately

$12,000 were issued by the life insurance company payable to Mrs.
Hook as guardian for each of the children, respectively.

Mrs.

Hook took these checks to the Trenton Trust Company to invest
them.

She showed the checks to a Mr. Patterson, an officer of

the trust company.
t

l1e

11,,

He told Mrs. Hook to endorse the checks in

,,xact same language as they were made payable.

This she did.

then invested $11,000 of each check in money market cer-
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tificates.

He personally saw both checks and Mrs.

endorsements on both checks as guardian.

However, when the

tificates of deposit were issued, also under Mr.
signature, the owners were shown to be Mrs.
tive child.

Honk's

Patterson's

Hook and each respe'

No indication was made that the certificates of

deposit were held by Mrs. Hook as guardian only.
A few months later, Mrs. Hook and her new husband went
to the same Mr. Patterson at the Trenton Trust Company to obtain
a loan.

He suggested to them that the certificates of deposit

could be used as collateral for the loan.

The Hooks pledged the

certificates as collateral for the loan.
Subsequently,

it was learned that the guardianship funds

had been used improperly, a new guardian was appointed, who made
demand on the Trenton Trust Company for a return of the certificates of deposit.

Trenton Trust Company filed a declaratory

action to determine whether it could retain the certificates of
deposit as collateral for the loan.
Based on the facts as set forth above, the court
concluded that Trenton Trust Company had actual knowledge that
the fiduciary

(Mrs. Hook) was misusing the guardianship funds.

The same bank officer not only discussed the guardianship
situation with and saw the checks made payable to Mrs.

Hook as

guardian, but also issued the certificates of deposit in the
improper name,

and finally handled the application of the cer-

tificates as collateral for

loans to Mrs.
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Hook and her new hus-

The bank officer obviously knew the certificates were
'"'I 11sed for the benefit of persons other than the children to
""

1 he

money belonged.

Once the "actual knowledge" standard

it was not difficult for the court to find that the bank

""';

1net,

iidd

sufficient information that it acted in bad faith.

The court

otated:
Although a showing of knowledge that the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his
fiduciary obligations is not necessary to
prove bad faith, such a showing is
clearly sufficient to prove bad faith.
[599 S.W.2d at 492]
Moreover, the Trenton Trust Company had a monetary interest in
the transaction because it had made a loan to Mrs. Hook and was
drawing interest on that loan.

The combination of "actual

knowledge" and monetary interest left the court no choice but to
find bad faith.
The facts in the instant case are much different from
those in Trenton Trust Co.

The actual knowledge standard has not

been met in the instant case.

Therefore, the court cannot rely

on proof of actual knowledge for a finding of bad faith.
curthermore, the Bank of Utah had no pecuniary interest in the
Pirst Capital account.

In other words, when the Bank paid checks

drawn on First Capital's account, it was not receiving any financial benefit.
tor.

It was simply performing its duty to its deposi-

of the checks paid by the Bank are alleged by

1ppellant to have gone directly to the Bank to pay loans or other
1

terns ,)r to act as col lateral for loans.
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Appellant suggests at pages 20 and 21 of

its brief that

the Bank acted out of a motive of self-interest when it failerl

1

contact Mr. Alder on August 19 or 20 after making payments on
several checks drawn against First Capital's account.

Appellant

not only misreads the evidence in this assertion, but it also
assumes facts that simply are not in evidence in the case.
Appellant states that "If what Mr. Alder said was true,

the

$260,000 deposit was not intended to cover the advances.

The use

of the deposit to satisfy the advances served to eliminate its
[the Bank's]

customer's debt to the bank and was,

direct financial benefit to the bank."

therefore, a

Appellant's Brief at 20.

The evidence shows that the Bank did not know for what
purpose the checks drawn on First Capital's account were being
paid on August 19.
true,

Even assuming everything Mr.

Alder said was

the Bank had no reason to believe that it was paying checks

for any purpose other than the purpose for which they were
intended.

It did not know who the seller of the property was.

It did not know where the property was.

It did not know who may

have held liens on the property or who the title company handling
the closing was.

Appellant assumes that on the basis of the sta-

tement by Mr.

Alder that the $260,000 was to be used for a spe-

cific purpose,

the Bank immediately is to become a detective and

find out whether every check drawn against First Capital's
account was for that specific purpose.
Bank's obligation.

This is simply not the

See Point I, supra.

Appellant also fails to appreciate the position the Bani
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in.

,u,1
re

in

This was a general checking account.
It was not a trust account.

It was a demand

The Bank and First Capital

the position of debtor and creditor.

The Bank was

111uetJted to First Capital, not vice versa, as appellant suggests.
The Bank was obligated to pay checks drawn on First Capital's
account on a first-come,

first-served basis so long as sufficient

funds were in the account to make payment.

Mr. Barth made this

very clear to Mr. Alder when they spoke on August 19.

Although

appellant suggests that Mr. Barth was to take everything Alder
said at face value, appellant also seems to be arguing that Alder
was not required to believe anything Barth said, if we are to
accept appellant's version.

It would have been a very easy

matter for Alder or appellant to provide the Bank with copies of
all relevant documents setting forth the nature of the escrow and
the obligations of First Capital.

This they failed to do.

As

indicated under Point I, the Bank had no obligation to make
inquiry simply because there may have been some suspicious circumstances.

The evidence makes very clear, however, that the

Bank's concern was not that First Capital was misappropriating
trust funds,

but that an overdraft might occur in the account.

Appellant further suggests that respondent should have
held up the payment of checks because of the hold that was placed
on First Capital's account.
i1at
'0

However, the evidence clearly shows

a cashier's check is the same as cash.

Failure of the Bank

pay checks drawn against the $260,000 would have been a breach

-29-

of the Bank's contract with its depositor.
Bank

&

Trust Co., 395 P.2d 11 (Colo.

In Rivera v. Central

1964), the Colorado Supreme

Court stated:
The relationship between a bank and a
depositor is
of debtor and creditor.
American National Bank v. First National
Bank, 130 Colo. 557, 277 P. 2d 951.
There
it was held "that a bank's obligation to
its depositors to pay out his funds only
to him are upon his written order."

It thus appears that a bank cannot unilaterally or in conjunction with a third
person alter the relationship between it
and its depositor, nor can it unilaterally or acting with a third person
change its liability to its depositor.
(395 P.2d at 13]
Even in a jurisdiction which has applied a less
stringent standard for proof of bad faith,

such as Missouri, the

factual basis necessary to prove bad faith has been one not
easily met.

In General Ins. Co. of America v. Commerce Bank of

St. Charles, 505 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1974), a guardianship account
was involved, wherein the guardian drew 25 checks payable to
himself, signed by himself and drawn against the guardianship
account.

Some of the checks contained notations stating that

they were in payment of services rendered by him to the guardian
estate.

The court stated that bad faith could be proved by a

showing that "it is 'commercially' unjustifiable for the (bank)
to disregard or refuse to learn facts readily available."

In

spite of this less stringent bad faith standard, the court held
that the bank did not act in bad faith.
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Moreover, the court

indicated that if a trustee draws a check in proper form,
"'I'

1s

w,t ,,,,

the

CJbligated to pay the check and to presume that the
is performing his duties properly.
General Ins. Co. of America, the bank knew that a

fiduciary account was involved because it was a guardianship
eccount.

But having that knowledge, and also having checks drawn

hy the guardian payable to himself, the court still refused to
hold that the bank had acted in a commercially unjustifiable
manner by disregarding or refusing to learn more facts about the
situation.

In the instant case, the Bank of Utah had only an

oral representation from Mr.
was involved.

Alder that a fiduciary relationship

The checking account itself gave no indication

that First Capital was holding funds as a fiduciary.

Of all the

checks drawn on First Capital's account and made exhibits by
appellant to the instant action, only one was made payable to
Roger LeFevre, and that one was in the relatively small amount of
$5,000.00,

[Exhibits 9-17), and there were sufficient funds in

First Capital's account prior to the $260,000 deposit to cover a
SS,000 check.

In General Ins. Co. of America, 25 checks were

made payable to the guardian himself, and still the court did not
find the bank's conduct to be commercially unjustifiable.

The

[nformation provided by Mr. Alder was simply insufficient to
require further inquiry by the Bank and even under the commercially unjustifiable standard, the Bank cannot be found to have
icted in bad faith,

as a matter of law.
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Appellant lists,
items which

in paragraphs numbered l

thruugh 10,

it asserts show the Bank had suft1cient 1nfnrmatinn

to prove that

it acted

1n bad faith under the Mi.ss<iuri standar,J.

Brief of Appellant at 18-19.

A review of these items will show

that they simply do not prove what appellant claims.
that the account was 13 days old.

Item 1 is

Appellant certainly is not

suggesting that the Bank should be suspicious of all accounts
that are 13 days old when paying checks drawn on those accounts.
Items 3 and 4 simply indicate the bank learned that a $95,500
check made payable to First Capital and deposited in its account
was not going to clear and could not be credited as collected
funds.

This

is no reflection on the activities of First Capital.

It is simply an indication that a person or entity who made a
check payable to First Capital did not have the funds sufficient
to cover the check.

Item 5 indicates that when it was learned

the $95,500 check could not be collected, a hold equal to that
amount was placed on the account,
made against the $95,500.

so that no payments would be

This was done to avoid an overdraft.

That hold was not ignored when checks totaling $201,806.15 were
paid by the assistant manager.

There were sufficient funds in

the account from the cashier's check in the amount of $260,000 to
pay those checks.
the account.

Item 6 indicates a second hold was placed on

This was explained by Mr.

Barth.

The hold was

placed on the account because a $250,000 check was presented for
payment late in the day on August 19, and Mr.
account could not cover that check.
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Barth knew the

However, on August 20, when

,t

f'apital's executive officer asked for a $5,000 check, Mr.
issued that check because there were sufficient funds to

'''"''r that ilmount.

He could not deny his customer access to

monies held in the demand account.
In Items 7 and 8, appellant appears to be using the
information set forth therein to claim that the Bank knew that
the one purpose for which the $260,000 was intended was not
being met because checks payable to four different persons were
issued and drawn on the account.

The fact that the $260,000 was

meant for a specific purpose certainly did not mean that more
than one check could not be drawn to meet that purpose.

Mr.

did not give sufficient information to Barth to support a
claim that only one check could be issued for the entire
$260,000.
Items 9 and 10 reflect Mr. Barth's concern that the
account might incur an overdraft, not that Mr. LeFevre was
misappropriating funds.

Mr. Barth simply did not know enough to

suspect misappropriation by First Capital.

It is clear under

Point I, supra, that more than suspicious activity must be shown
before a bank must make further inquiries.

Mr. Purles, Research

Planning's officer, and Mr. Weech, Research Planning's attorney,
both testified that they had no reason to question the honesty of
'-Ir.

Lefevre.

[Tr.

361, 453]

They certainly had had more

c'xperience dealing with Mr.

Lefevre than had Mr.

Jppellant believes that

Barth, a person who had little or no
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Barth.

Yet,

contact with Mr.

Lefevre and harl no knowledge of the transacticino

between First Capital

Research Planning, shoulrl automaticall

suspect Mr.

Lefevre of wrongdoing because his account might he

overdrawn.

This is clearly an exaggerated approach to the evi-

dence.

The Bank acted honestly and in good faith, and even under

the Missouri approach to bad faith,
prove bad faith.

there are simply no facts to

Therefore, even if this court accepts

appellant's definition of bad faith,

the Bank of Utah is, as a

matter of law, not liable.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §7-3-50
AND/OR §70A-3-603.
Utah Code Annotated §7-3-50 was in effect on August 19,
1980, when Steve Alder came to the Bank of Utah.

Sect ion 7-3-50

states:
Notice to any bank or trust company doing
business in this state of an adverse
claim to a deposit standing on its books
to the credit of any person shall not be
effectual to cause such bank or trust
company to recognize such adverse
claimant, unless such adverse claimant
shall either procure a restraining order,
inJunction or other appropriate process
against such bank or trust company in an
action instituted by him wherein the person to whose credit the deposit stands is
made a party, or shall execute to such
bank or trust company a good and sufficient bond, in double the amount
claimed, indemnifying it from any and all
liability, loss, damage, costs, and
expenses for and on account of the
payment of such adverse claim or the
dishonor of the check or other order of
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the person to whose credit the deposit
stands on its books; provided, that this
section shall not apply in any instance
where the person to whose credit the
deposit stands is a fiduciary for such
adverse claimant and the facts constituting such relationship, and also the
facts showing reasonable cause for belief
on the part of such claimant that the
fiduciary is about to misappropriate such
deposit, are made to appear by the affidavit of such claimant.
The facts of the instant case fall squarely within the
terms of §7-3-50.

Steve Alder asserted an adverse claim to the

$260,000 deposited in First Capital's account at the Bank of Utah
on August 19, 1980, during Alder's conversation with Roger Barth.
Alder told Barth that the $260,000 was to be used for a specific
purpose.

It goes without saying that if Alder had never come to

the Bank of Utah and made this statement to Roger Barth,
appellant would never have even filed suit.

Alder's statements

to Barth are the only basis upon which appellant can claim the
Rank had only information regarding First Capital's fiduciary
status.
Appellant admitted at trial that it had not met the
requirements of §7-3-50 or §70A-3-603, which will be discussed
below.

However, appellant apparently takes the position that

neither §7-3-50 nor §70A-3-603 apply to this case and that Alder
not make an adverse claim to the $260,000 by his statements
Jn August 19 to Mr. Barth.

It is true that Alder did not speci-

'ically object to First Capital having possession of the
''6U,OOO

in

its account.

Indeed, the escrow agreement con-
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templated and required First Capital to hold $260,000.

The fact

that Alder did not object to First Capital's having possession nr
the $260,000 is not the relevant or critical issue when determining whether Alder made an adverse claim by his statements to
Barth.
The key point is the context in which Alder's statements
were made to the Bank.

The Bank stood in a debtor-creditor rela-

tionship to First Capital.
supra.

Rivera v. Central Bank & Trust Co.,

First Capital had a general checking account with the

Bank of Utah.

Roger LeFevre's signature was the only one

required on checks drawn against First Capital's account.

It was

a demand account, meaning that so long as sufficient funds were
available to cover checks, and the funds had been collected, the
Bank was obligated to pay the checks.

When a deposit is made to

such an account, from the Bank's standpoint, all funds deposited
to the account are available to pay checks drawn by the
authorized signator against the account.

There are no restric-

tions as to when, where or how the money can be used.

The Bank

had no knowledge of the real estate loan transaction and escrow
agreement among Research Planning, Buie and First Capital.
Bank knew nothing about the sale of real estate in Ogden.

The
When

First Capital presented the $260,000 cashier's check for deposit
to its account on August 19, 1980, except for the large amount of
the check,

it was treated no differently than any other deposit

made by any other individual or company to a general checking
account.

The Bank harl no reason to bel ioeve that any restrict i'>n-
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werP lo he placed on First Capital's use of the $260,000.
Into this context came Steve Alder, who told Roger Barth
,,,1
,1

$260,000 was to be used for a specific purpose.

111e

3tPment

t11r

This

implied that First Capital was excluded from using it

any other purposes.

An adverse claimant to a deposit is

defined generally as a stranger making claim to the account.

See

First National Bank of Ariz. v. Butler, 82 Ariz. 361, 313 P.2d
121 (1957).

Alder had no contractual rights with the Bank of

Utah relating to First Capital's general checking account.

Alder

was a stranger to the bank account insofar as the Bank was concerned.

He made a statement, which if true, would restrict First

Capital's use of the deposit and therefore would substantially
change the normal use of a general checking account insofar as
the Bank (debtor) and its depositor (creditor) were concerned.
An adverse claimant has also been defined as "one who is
not shown on the books of the bank as a depositor."
State National Bank, 47 so. 2d 261 (Ala. 1950).

Perdue v.

Alder was not a

depositor of the Bank, Research Planning was not a depositor with
the Bank of Utah, and therefore, any claims made by Alder that
the money was to be used for a specific purpose, were adverse to
that deposit.
When Alder made his statements regarding the $260,000
deposit

to Barth, the Bank was placed in a position where it

either held up payments on checks drawn by First Capital on the
and faced potential liability to First Capital, or it
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paid the checks drawn by First Capital and fa,:ced thP potpntial"
liability to the 1dver''' ,-laim;int
be valirl.

dilemma.

if t.he ,1,iv•'1

Sect ion 7-J-SO was enacted tn remedy

,:l.'1m pr,1v"i 1

A bank need nut heerl n11tice ot an

a court order restraining the hank

-..;uc·h a

Just

claim

is obtained by the adverse

claimant, or the adverse claimant provides the bank with an
indemnity bond, or,

if the depositor is a fiduciary,

the adverse

claimant provides an affidavit setting forth such relationship
and facts showing reasonable cause to believe the fiduciary is
about to misappropriate the deposit.

Neither Alder nor Research

Planning met any of the above requirements of §7-3-50.

Their

failure to meet those requirements precludes Research Planning
from now asserting a claim of

liability against the Bank for its

payment of checks drawn against the $260,000 deposit.
In National City Bank v. Continental National Bank &
Trust Co., 83 F.2d 134 (10th Cir.

1936), a Mr. Waggoner fraudu-

lently procured approximately $30,000 from plaintiff.

Waggoner

then deposited the money in a checking account in the name of a
Mr. Anderson in Continental Bank in Salt Lake City.

Waggoner

a $25,000 note secured by certain collateral with Continental
Bank.

After the deposit of $30,000 to Anderson's account at

Continental Bank, Anderson advised Continental Bank that he woul1
purchase the $25,000 note.
payment of the note,

The hank credited $25,000 towards

transferred the note and collateral to

Anderson,

leaving a balance of approx1matel1 $5,000 in Anders"n'

account.

Shortly thereafter,

plaintiff notified defendant of
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"11"1wr' '->

,,,.,,

fraudulent conduct in procuring the $30,000,

t.his notification, Anderson wrote a check for the

''"'"'ny SS,000 payable to a Mr. Webster.
'1w

_·iie1:k

A few

Continental Bank paid

to Webster, thus depleting the entire $30,000.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant nearly four years

itter the above-described transactions were completed.

The lower

'"urt entered a decree in favor of defendant, and plaintiff
ippealed.
Jccount,

In discussing the $5,000 check drawn against the
the Tenth Circuit Court stated:
This sum [approximately $5 ,000] then
stood to the credit of Anderson as a
depositor in the bank and, upon presentation of his check by an identified
payee, the bank was confronted with an
embarrassing situation.
Although having
been notified that the money then on
deposit was part of a fund procured by
fraud which others claimed, but no proof
of this claim having been presented, the
demand was being made by defendant's
depositor through his check for the
amount standing to his credit and it [the
bank] elected to pay its depositor upon
his tendered check.
Whether or not the
bank is protected in its action in this
respect is the question now presented.
The determination must be predicated
upon the basis of two defenses:
First,
the consideration of a Utah statute; and,
second, laches on the part of plaintiffs.
[83 F.2d at 136-137]
The court then quoted Utah R. S.

7-3-52, which was later

'"11fied and became Utah Code Annotated §7-3-50, and stated:
This statute appears to be the embodiment in statutory form of a rule having
it-; roots in the decisions of numerous
courts.
In Nehawka Bank v. Ingersoll,
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• the language of the court is as
follows:
'DepositR in the bank create between
it and the depositor, or the person to
whom the credit for the deposit is
given, the relation of debtor and creditor.
So, where a bank receives money
from a person, and gives him credit
therefor, it is in duty bound to honor
his checks to the amount of such deposit, and it cannot refuse to honor his
checks or drafts against the fund on
the ground that the money deposited
belonged to some other person, or that
the title of the depositor to it is
defective.
These are matters in which
the bank is not interested or concerned
until the third party who claims to own
the fund shall proceed to enforce his
rights.'
[l.2_. at 137]
The court then concluded:
[T]he statute here involved has been
enacted for the protection of banks in
situations like the present by placing
the burden upon some claimant to a bank
deposit to take some affirmative steps by
restraining order, indemnifying bond, or
affidavit which will serve to protect the
bank against damages which may be suffered by its depositor through the refusal of the bank to pay.
[Id.]
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in
favor of defendant.

The court also found that the plaintiffs

were guilty of laches due to their failure to take any af firmative action against the bank until nearly four years after the
fraudulent transactions.
In Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55
Misc.2d 1052, 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1968), plaintiff claimed that
the defendant trust company had been properly notified of an
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drlvPrse claim to the depositor's accounts when plaintiffs sent a
'I'\' ,.f a summons to the trust company.

The New York court held

··•"11rling a copy of the summons did not meet the requirements
,

New

t

York's adverse claims statute, which contains nearly idenlanguage as U.C.A. §7-3-50, and that in the absence of a

r2straining order or indemnifying bond, or some other legal process,

the defendant could not be held liable for failing to

restrain the accounts.
The conclusion is that §7-3-50 provides respondent with
a complete defense to appellant's claims in this action because
appellant failed to comply with the requirements of the statute.
Appellant did not obtain a court order restraining the Bank from
paying checks on the First Capital account, and appellant did not
obtain an indemnity bond for respondent on said account.

Even

assuming that First Capital was a fiduciary for appellant,
appellant still failed to meet the statute's requirement of provirling the Bank with the required affidavit.

Therefore,

appellant's failure to comply with the statute precludes it from
obtaining relief from the Bank.

See, also Sanders v. First

National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 292 P.2d 160 (Okla. 1955);
Ciriello v.

East Chester Savings Bank, 343 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1973);

fletcher v. Bank of Meeker, 376 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1962); Staley v.
Brown,

146 So. 2d 739 (Miss.

1962); Solicitor for the Affairs v.

Trust Co., 94 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1949); and Desert Bermuda
v.

Union Bank, 71 Cal.Rptr. 93 (1968),

Although U.C.A.

§7-3-50 was repealed in 1981 with the
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passage of the "Financial Institutions Act of 1981," it was the
applicable law as of August-September,

1980, governing the Lran

sactions involved in this case, and is still controlling as tn
the issues involved in this case.

See Okland Construction Co. v.

Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974).
Moreover, §7-1-601 of the "Financial Institutions Act of
1981," sets forth the same basic requirements as §7-3-50, as
follows:
Receipt of a notice of an adverse claim
to a deposit or other account standing on
the books of any depository institution
doing business in this state, does not
obligate the depository institution to
the adverse claimant, unless the notice
is given pursuant to an appropriate court
order, obtained by the adverse claimant
in a legal action instituted by him in
which the person to whose credit the
deposit stands is made a party.
Such
depository institution may also pay the
adverse claim, if the claimant executes
to the depository institution a good and
sufficient bond in double the amount
claimed, indemnifying it from any and all
liability, loss, damage, costs and
expenses including attorneys' fees for
and on account of the payment of the
adverse claim or the dishonor of a check
or other instrument of the person to
whose credit the deposit stands on its
books.
Under U.C.A. §7-3-50, plaintiff's claims are barred.
Alternatively, plaintiff's claims are barred by Utah
Code Annotated §70A-3-603, which states,

in part:

The liability of any party is discharged
to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made
with knowledge of a claim of another per-
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son to the instrument unless prior to
such payment or satisfaction the person
making the claim either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the parties
seeking the discharge or enjoins payment
or satisfaction by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction in an action in
which the adverse claimant and the holder
are parties.
The Bank of Utah was a party under the terms of the
above-referenced statute.

The individuals and/or companies to

whom the bank made payments on checks drawn by First Capital,
were holders under the terms of the statute, and the Bank of
Utah's liability is discharged to the extent of payment made to
those holders even if the bank had knowledge of an adverse claim
to the proceeds represented by those checks.

The bank can only

be held liable if the adverse claimant either supplied indemnity
or enjoins payment by order of court.

Research Planning met

neither of the above-referenced requirements, and, therefore, is
barred from recovery against the bank by §?OA-3-603.
In French Bank of Cal. v. First National Bank of
Louieville, 585 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1979), the Kentucky Court of
Appeals applied the policy underlying both §?OA-3-603 and
§7-3-50.

French Bank mistakenly wired $30,000 twice, instead of

iust once, to defendant to be credited to one of defendant's
depositors.

After the mistake was noticed, a vice-president at

Prench Bank contacted a vice-president at the defendant bank
1aquesting the return of the second $30,000 deposit or requesting
1

hat

ir

be frozen to prevent withdrawal.

m1sed to indemnify defendant

French Bank also pro-

if defendant would return the
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$30,000, but no actual indemnity bond or agreement was ever given
to defendant.

Another of defendant's officers contacted the

depositor and asked to meet with him,

but the depositor sub-

sequently came to defendant bank, contacted an employee who was
not aware of the request for return of the money, and the depositor withdrew $30,000 and placed it in another account.

The depo-

sitar subsequently became insolvent and French Bank sought to be
reimbursed from defendant.
The Kentucky court stated that the adverse claims
statute would probably apply to this situation, but also stated
that the policy under U.C.C. §3-603
applicable.

[U.C.A. §70A-3-603] was

The adverse claim statute was a new one in Kentucky

and the court stated:
The policy is sound, and with or without
the new statute, it is appropriate in
this situation.
First National innocently received the $30,000 and made the
deposit as instructed.
Ten days later it
was informed by one side of a mistake.
First National could either ignore the
claim, until protected, and incur the
wrath of French Bank, or honor the claim
and subject itself to damages by its
customer for potential wrongful dishonor,
a no win situation.
The protection was
not provided, and we agree with the trial
court that the law in this situation was
for First National.
[27 u.c.c. Reporting
Service at 1055-1056]
Thus, the policy provisions under §70A-3-603 are basically the same as under §7-3-50, requiring a plaintiff/adverse
claimant to provide a bank with either court order or indemnity
before it can claim the bank is liable for paying out on deposit;
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.i<J"

1

nst which it has an adverse claim.

Appellant failed to meet

r"quirements of either §7-3-50 or §70A-3-603, and therefore
I

'1ms against respondent are barred, as a matter of law.

Moreover, since the requirements of U.C.A. §7-3-50
• <lllf

l ict

with U.C.A. §22-1-9, the statute passed later is

controlling.

82 C.J.S. Statutes §363; Becker Products Co. v.

State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 587, 58 P.2d 36 (1936); Pacific
Intermountain Exp. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316
P.2d 549 (1957); Bateman v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah,
7

lit ah

2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381 ( 1958).
U.C.A. §22-1-9 was first enacted in 1925, while U.C.A.

§7-3-50 was first enacted in 1929.

Thus, §7-3-50 controls.

U.C.A. §70A-10-103 is a general repealer section applicable to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, of which §70A-3-603 is
a part.

Section 70A-10-103 states:

"Except as provided in the

following section, all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with
this act are hereby repealed."
§70A-10-104,

The "following section,"

lists certain statutes not repealed by the Utah

Uniform Commercial Code, but U.C.A. §22-1-9 is not on the list.
Section 70A-10-103 was enacted in 1965.

Thus, to the extent

is inconsistent with §70A-3-603, §22-1-9 is repealed.
Definite,

irreconciliable inconsistency exists between

'22-1-9 and §§7-3-50 and 70A-3-603.

Therefore, §22-1-9 is not

·rrntu,lling, and under §§7-3-50 and/or 70A-3-603 appellant's
'la1m:-; (_1re barred.
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CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the judgment in favor of
l•'nt

because the trial court applied the proper standard in

1 '•1·; that

proof 0f bad faith under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9

"'l"1res proof of dishonesty.

1

Appellant readily admits it cannot

P" "", dishonesty on the part of the Bank of Utah.

The trial court's findings of fact that the Bank had no
kn"wledge of misappropriation and also that the Bank did not act
rl1shonestly or in bad faith are supported by the evidence and
should not be disturbed.
Even if this court were to apply a less stringent bad
laith standard, respondent, as a matter of law, on the basis of
Lhe

evidence set forth at trial, did not act in bad faith and

cannot be held liable.
Alternatively, appellant's claims against respondent are
harred under Utah Code Annotated §7-3-50 and/or §70A-3-603
because appellant failed to meet the requirements set forth under
those statutes for asserting an adverse claim to a deposit and/or
instrument held by the Bank.
A bank cannot act as a detective for a principal who
makes the mistake of using a dishonest fiduciary.

Utah Code

§§22-1-9, 7-3-50, and 70A-3-603 are all designed to
pt >tect banks and to limit and narrow their liability where a
11

•;iionest fiduciary has defrauded his principal.

In today's

w1.oty where banks are required to handle thousands of transac1

111",,

much more

is required than an oral statement by a total
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stranger to the bank in order to prove actual knowledge or bad
faith, or to require the bank to respond to an adverse claim.
Respectfully submitted this __1_._ day of May,

1983.
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